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Abstract
We introduce relationalism and discuss how it is useful for interpret-
ing probability theory and quantum mechanics. This paper is written in
relatively lay terms and presumes no prior knowledge of quantum theory.
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In this short note we will try and learn a few things from the major modern
physical theories of our time and then we shall try to apply these lessons to
quantum theory. First we will introduce a broad range of theories that we call
‘relational’ theories, noting that quantum theory is not one of them. Then we
will discuss a possible way of making quantum theory relational as well.
Leibniz, a contemporary of Newton, introduced two principles which to-
gether form an approach to physics which is called ‘relationalism’:
1. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): Every single element of a phys-
ical theory must be rationally justified.
2. The Principle of Identifying the Indiscernible (PII): If we have no rational
reason or ability to distinguish features of a theory then we should identify
them, else the PSR is not satisfied.
One can consider these two principles criteria which ensure ‘rationality’—or, in
the least, criteria which ensure a pragmatic approach [1]. They are basically
principles that ensure that we adopt what might be called ‘parsimony’—they
ensure that we only use facts or distinctions that we are rationally compelled
to use. It is pragmatic to adopt these two principles simply because there are
clearly many more things that we cannot rationally justify in comparison to
those things that we can, and rather than adopt a ‘trial-by-error’ approach
it seems more parsimonious to only use axioms or facts we can all accept by
using our reasoning skills. The PSR basically says that if we all sit back in our
armchairs, mull it over for a while, and still cannot all agree that some fact
about the world must be the case (without resorting to mere proclamations of
faith), then we must reject it from our physical theory. (Of course, it might
be that what we think as reasonable and rational now might turn out to be
irrational in the future, but this should not stop us trying our best.)
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There is only one argument we know of against relationalism when framed
in such pragmatic terms; namely that it is sometimes even more pragmatic to
use arbitrary conventions which we cannot justify rationally, simply to make
the maths easier. However, relationalism, in some form or another, helped
people to design all the modern physical theories we investigate today (with the
exception of quantum theory). For example, relationalism helped Einstein to
design General Relativity (GR). Einstein ensured that he only ever discussed
the relationships between events—‘spacetime coincidences’—and he tried not
to add anything spurious to the catalogue of spacetime coincidences because
these were the only elements in the theory he could rationally justify (by the
PSR he did not want to use anything other than the catalogue of spacetime
coincidences). Clearly we don’t want to, by convention alone, assign numbers
arbitrarily to all objects in the universe and then call these numbers ‘positions’.
This is exactly what we would be doing if we were to try and define positions
absolutely. We simply don’t have a device—one might call it a ‘positometer’—
which, when we point it at an object (and that object alone), reads off the
object’s ‘position’ [2]. Similarly, if we look down our best microscopes we do
not see magical glowing numbers that we might call positions. Clearly we do
have devices that can read off positions if we make arbitrary conventions such
as “distances and angles are measured relative to the Eiffel tower”—this is not
what we mean by a positometer. Anyone can make arbitrary conventions but
we want to find physical theories that aliens could also discover. If we wish to
enter communion with such aliens—or, to put it differently, with the natural
world itself—we must not use such arbitrary human conventions. It turns out
that such an approach actually helps us find physical theories. This is borne
out by the fact that the essential features of all modern physical theories, except
one, are relational in this ‘parsimonious’ sense. So we must reject the idea of
a positometer by the PSR. This rejection, via Einstein and a lot of hard work,
gave us GR, a relational approach to spacetime.
As Smolin has emphasised [3], it turns out that all modern gauge theo-
ries (which includes the standard model and string theory) also have relational
aspects. Gauge theories, excluding GR, do not treat spacetime relationally (al-
though of course they might in the future) but they do treat charge conventions
relationally. Just as we don’t have a positometer, we don’t have devices which
measure what absolute sign a charge, like an electron, has. Clearly we do have
devices which can measure the signs of charges if we make arbitrary conventions
such as “the electrons contained within Tony Blair are all negative” but there is
no device that measures signs without making such arbitrary conventions. These
gauge theories ensure that we don’t arbitrarily assign absolute signs to charges.
The other ‘charges’ in the standard model and string theory are more exotic
but the general theme remains the same.
There is, of course, some sense to the idea that it is convenient to make
arbitrary conventions. When measuring distances while designing a house it is
convenient to be able to measure them accurately with respect to a certain ref-
erence point. (Clearly, however, it is not convenient to always measure distances
from the Eiffel tower.) So we come again to the question of whether we should
simply use arbitrary conventions because they are convenient? The simple fact
is that we should make arbitrary conventions for convenience but only when we
do not care how such ‘positions’ or ‘signs’ come about. Arbitrary conventions
do not have any direct explanatory power at all, they are tools which we use
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to explain other things. The kinematics of space allow us to explain how to
build a house but do not help us explain how the particular space in which the
house is built came about. Also, we are free to make arbitrary conventions while
discussing buildings, but we are not so free when discussing the whole universe
as we have no reference points outside the universe (we must define distances
with respect to things inside, so we may as well, all things being equal, define
them relationally).
Clearly we do not claim here that all these theories are uniquely relational.
We could interpret anything using arbitrary conventions when it is useful to do
so. We simply mean that in designing theories which have explanatory power
we should not introduce arbitrary conventions and that it is, in fact, pragmatic
and convenient not to introduce such things. We are far more likely to find
results that aren’t factitious by ensuring we don’t use factitious assumptions.
To explain what we mean when we say that arbitrary conventions do not have
any direct explanatory power at all it is perhaps easier to turn to yet another
of the great modern relational theories; namely Darwinian evolution (which is
clearly a physical theory even if also a biological one). We can easily discuss
the ‘kinematical’ distinctions between different species alive today. Species can
be said to be ‘alike’ if they share common features. Of course the notion of
‘species’ is a rather arbitrary convention, as is the notion of ‘common features’
but, nonetheless, many of us desire an explanation for why those species that are
alike are, in fact, alike. Clearly we do not have a ‘speciesometer’ which reads off
which species an organism belongs to without making arbitrary conventions—
species, like signs and positions, are themselves convenient conventions! Hence
it is not the conventions that matter so much as the relationships between them.
Thus we require a dynamical explanation for how the particular relationships
between the present set of species came to be. This is what evolution gives us;
thus, we argue, evolution is a relational theory. It is a general feature of all rela-
tional theories that they explain what were previously considered ‘kinematical’
or absolute structures by dynamical means. In GR it is the causal structure
that is considered dynamical (whereas in Newtonian physics it was considered
a kinematical idea). The present particular causal structure of the universe is
something that is dynamically contingent upon the distribution of matter and
energy contained within it and the history of the universe. Similarly, the taxo-
nomic relationships between species, previously considered ‘kinematically’, are
now explained dynamically. Such relationships are contingent upon the particu-
lar history of the process of life on Earth. (There is a similar explanatory power
in gauge theories related to what is called ‘spontaneous symmetry breaking’
but we won’t go into that here). Furthermore, such relationships ought to be
explained in such a manner—we explicitly have no other way to explain them.
We cannot explain a ‘thing’ without explaining how that ‘thing’ came to be.
So, this is all well and good, but such an account of modern physical theory
is surely uncontroversial? Why do we feel the need to write about this? Note,
however, there is one of the great modern theories which is emphatically not
designed in a relational manner; namely quantum theory. We want to bring
quantum theory into the fold (for other attempts see [4, 5, 6]).
Please excuse the further ambulation; we shall discuss quantum theory
shortly but we must first tackle quantum theory’s classical analogue: proba-
bility theory. Here we have a situation which is clearly analogous to the the-
ory of evolution; we have a set of convenient conventions (probabilities) which
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need explanation. In order to follow a relational approach the things that mat-
ter are clearly the relationships between probabilities and not the probabilities
themselves. To borrow Mana’s phrase [7], probabilities are not “experimentally
observed regularities”; just as positions, signs and species are not. Rather they
are ‘theoretically assigned regularities’. So, if we are to also bring probability
theory into the fold then we must explicitly discuss it in relational terms. The
only approach we know of that vaguely does this, at least in part, is Cox’s ap-
proach to probability theory [8, 9]. Here the relationships which matter are the
functional relationships between probabilities. In evolutionary terms we have
a certain amount of freedom in how we assign species to organisms; similarly,
in probability theory, we have a certain amount of freedom in assigning prob-
abilities to propositions (because they are arbitrary conventions)—there is no
a priori reason we should use real numbers, nor, if we do use the reals, to use
the range [0, 1] in particular. We must, however, ensure that the relevant rela-
tionships between probabilities are maintained regardless of whether one uses
a particular convention and this is what Cox’s axioms of probability theory
ensure. But what are these axioms?
Let’s discuss a set of propositions {α, β, γ, ...} which can be related by using
the standard ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’ operations, denoted ∩, ∪ and ∼ respectively.
Such operations behave as one expects na¨ıvely—think of Venn diagrams or
Boolean logic. Cox’s two axioms are as follows:
p(α ∩ β|I) := F [p(α|βI), p(β|I)] (1)
and
p(∼ α|I) := G[p(α|I)], (2)
where F and G are two arbitrary functions that are sufficiently well-behaved for
our purposes [10] and I is the notation we use to emphasise that probabilities
are contingent upon prior information. We do not need an ∪-axiom because
the operations ∩, ∪ and ∼ are interdependent. So we argue that it is rational
to presume that the probability that we assign to a must, in the least, be
functionally related to the probability we assign to ∼ a—this is (2), one of the
minimal desiderata of rationality that Cox used. We call it minimal because
all known probability theories obey it, and we can, it seems, all agree that
any probability theory ought to obey it. If a probability theory were not to
obey it then p(a|I) would be unrelated to p(∼ a|I) and such p’s would not be
useful as any notion of ‘preference’ or ‘plausibility’ at all. The other axiom
(1) is a little more complicated, but it certainly seems natural that in order
to assign a probability to the proposition a ∩ b we should not need any more
information than the probability that we assign to ‘a given b is the case’ and
the probability we assign to b being the case. Equally, by swapping a’s for b’s
and b’s for a’s we have an analogous conclusion. All known probability theories
satisfy these axioms and they are reasonable (we make very minimal assumptions
about how some probabilities are related to others). Of course, there is nothing
absolute about rationality and some reasoner of the future might be able to
argue reasonably that we should use other axioms or introduce further ones. The
important point is not that we regard these axioms as inherently ‘rational’ (as we
don’t) but rather that we have no clear and unambiguous argument for using
axioms that go beyond these (such as demanding a priori that probabilities
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are real numbers). We don’t have a ‘probability-computer’ to which we can
feed-in any proposition (and that proposition alone) such that it calculates the
‘absolute’ real probability unique to that proposition. Rather probabilities are
defined relationally over the whole algebra of propositions using Cox’s axioms.
If you accept the argument for defining positions relationally, an analogous
argument follows through for probabilities.
We say that F and G are ‘arbitrary’ in the sense that we can find no com-
pelling reason why we ought to use a particular F and G. This idiosyncratic
‘relational’ way for putting it is, of course, our own—as is any error made in
doing such a thing—but we think that this explains Cox’s approach quite well.
Cox explicitly also assumed that probabilities are real numbers which is an as-
sumption above and beyond (1) and (2)—we call such an assumption Cox’s
zeroth axiom. Implicit as part of this zeroth axiom is the minimal ‘monoticity’
assumption:
if a ≤ b then, presumably, p(a|I) ≤ p(b|I), (3)
where ≤ is, in the least, a partial order in both the context of the Boolean
algebra of propositions and the probability space. For example, in a Boolean
logic represented by a Venn diagram ‘a ≤ b’ is represented by set inclusion. (To
avoid confusion one might prefer to use different symbols for the partial order
on the proposition space and the partial order on the probability space but we
will soon run out of convenient symbols. The meaning of the symbol ≤ should
be evident by context.) Standard probability theory obey’s all these axioms,
but it does not satisfy these axioms uniquely. And this is exactly the point;
the above axioms seem reasonable for any probability theory. If we were to
introduce further axioms that we are not rationally compelled to use (in order
to arbitrarily ensure that probabilities were real numbers for example) then we
would be disobeying the PSR.
So we can categorise the essential relationships between probabilities without
making particular arbitrary conventions (i.e. we don’t choose a particular F or
G and nor do we choose to use real numbers per se). This is analogous to framing
general relativity in a ‘co-ordinate free’ or ‘background independent’ way (for
an accessible introduction to background independence see [1]). All relational
theories can be framed in such a ‘background independent’ manner and there is
a certain beauty in doing so since we explicitly remove the arbitrary conventions
from the very formalism we use—this increases our chance of speaking sensibly
since we have removed all factitious conventions from the very mathematical
language we use to speak about the theory1. Thus we do not need to worry
about any odd factitious relationships that arise through the use of odd factitious
conventions (cf. [4, 6, 12, 13]).
Let us reiterate that we are not claiming that these relational theories are
absolutely relational in their outlook—there is no such thing as absolute ratio-
nality. For example, in GR the topology remains kinematically fixed and is
kept as part of the ‘background’ of the theory [1]. Similarly, in our probability
analysis one might ask the question “why assume these relationships are func-
tional relationships?”. Perhaps there are some hidden assumptions in the use
of functions over more abstract and general notions (perhaps involving category
1Cf. Wittgenstein’s famous proposition 7: “What we cannot speak about we must pass
over in silence” [11].
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theory). This is where the competing form of pragmatism kicks in. The theory
would be completely unwieldy to handle if we tried to go too far too quickly.
Nonetheless, the fixed background topology is beginning to be seriously ques-
tioned in quantum gravity theories, and one might later question the use of
functions per se in this probability analysis. Strictly speaking, we find partially
relational theories and then try to make them more relational. Nor do we claim
that standard probability theory (which uses further dubious axioms to ensure
that probabilities are real numbers) isn’t useful, it clearly is; nonetheless, there
might be cases where using standard probability theory causes factitious infer-
ences which result from the use of factitious axioms (axioms which don’t obey
the PSR).
So, we can frame probability theory in a manner that arguably obeys Leib-
niz’s rational desiderata such that we remove arbitrary conventions from the very
formalism we use. Can we extend this relational approach to probability theory
to give a dynamical explanation of the catalogue of relationships between prob-
abilities? How does this catalogue of relationships between probabilities evolve?
In GR we can show that the causal relationships between spacetime points are
dynamically contingent relationships. Similarly for the taxonomic relationships
we find in biology. What is the analogous dynamical explanation we need for
probability theory?
The key is in our gnomic use of the ‘context’ I in our notation. Clearly
we can use other propositions as such ‘contexts’—we can ask: “What is the
probability of proposition α being true given that β is true?” and we denote
such contingent probabilities as p(α|βI).
Cox’s ∩-axiom (1), as Cox proved [8], ensures that Bayes’ rule is satisfied:
p(α|βI) =
p(β|αI)p(α|I)
p(β|I)
. (4)
Hence we can ‘update’ probability assignments. Probabilities are contingent on
the particular propositions that happen to be known to be true. But are they
dynamically contingent? Of course they are as long as one assumes that propo-
sitions become apt dynamically. Hence the functional relationships between
probabilities are not fixed, absolute or ‘kinematical’ relationships but are dy-
namically contingent upon which propositions are known to be true (and other
prior information). We presume that there is a dynamical process by which
some propositions become apt and we argue that it would be irrational to think
otherwise. In standard probability theory we usually presume that there is such
a dynamical process and that it is described by classical physics. A proposition
like “the rocket lands near me on the Earth’s surface when the time on my
watch is between t1 and t2” is a proposition that, if it becomes true at all, will
become true dynamically. Hence in classical probability theory the functional
relationships between probabilities will be dynamically contingent relationships
by Bayes’ rule.
We keep the I in the notation because we don’t know how to interpret a
probability that isn’t contingent as then they would be ‘kinematical’ or absolute
notions—something given by a fictitious ‘probability-computer’.
So, finally, we come to quantum theory. Quantum theory is tautologically
a generalised form of probability theory so perhaps this rationalist account will
help us.
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In probability theory the natural algebra of propositions is Boolean. We peg
probabilities to these propositions in a manner which maintains certain func-
tional relationships between probabilities. In quantum theory we have a slightly
different set of propositions that behave in a slightly different way. Also, in quan-
tum theory we don’t, strictly speaking, peg probabilities to these propositions.
Rather we peg something else which we shall, naturally, call a ‘peg’.
So in quantum theory we have a natural set of propositions which we again
call α, β, γ, and so forth, since they have the same meaning as they do normally.
They are simply statements like “it is true that the value of quantity A is
a”. However, these propositions behave in an odd way—they aren’t related by
the normal Boolean operations ∩, ∪ and ∼. Rather there are novel, but still
roughly analogous, operations ∧, ∨ and ¬ (and a notion of partial order that
we call again ≤). Thus, for example, the ‘and’ operation ∧ allows us to make
propositions like “it is true that the value of quantity A is a ‘and’ it is true that
the value of quantity B is b”. These operations aren’t the same as the ‘normal’
Boolean ones, but they are sufficiently similar for us to make na¨ıve progress. If
we were to peg truth values then we would assign either 0 or 1 to each of these
propositions in a way which satisfies certain consistency conditions or, if we were
to peg ‘probabilities’ to these propositions, we would assign real numbers in the
interval [0, 1] to all these propositions in a way that ensures the relationships
between ‘probabilities’ are maintained. It turns out we cannot consistently do
the former2 but we can do the latter using what is called Gleason’s theorem
[14]. These ‘probabilities’ don’t behave like normal probabilities in probability
theory—this causes a lot of confusion and it is not clear whether this confusion
arises simply because we tend to think of the probabilities we assign to Boolean
propositions as the same kinds of arbitrary conventions we assign to quantum
propositions. Hence we would prefer to use a different name. For the time being
we resort to calling these conventions ‘pegs’ as this seems to emphasise what
we are doing—we peg ‘pegs’ to propositions3—and we don’t have to change
the notation because ‘peg’ begins with a ‘p’. Standard probabilities are thus a
type of peg which is relevant for Boolean propositions. In order to investigate
whether some other type of peg4 is relevant for quantum theory we approach
the problem from a relational perspective.
We can, for example, na¨ıvely use Cox’s axioms as we did above:
p(α ∧ β|I) := F ′[p(α|βI), p(β|I)] (5)
and
p(¬α|I) := G′[p(α|I)] (6)
where F ′ and G′ are again arbitrary functions that are sufficiently well-behaved
for our purposes. Similarly we can also assume a minimal version of Cox’s zeroth
axiom such that
if α ≤ β then, presumably, p(α|I) ≤ p(β|I). (7)
2This is, for those in the know, the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem, and is related to the
problem of using Boolean logic to assign Boolean truth values to a quantum one, but it won’t
concern us here.
3Similarly, we ‘posit’ positions in Newtonian physics.
4Emphatically not probabilities per se.
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We have called conventions which satisfy these axioms ‘pegs’ rather than
‘probabilities’ simply to emphasise that they are things that we append to
propositions and to ensure we don’t confuse them with ‘probabilities’ per se
which are pegs pegged to a Boolean logic and are often additionally constrained
to be real numbers in the interval [0, 1]. Thus we need not be so confused when
pegs behave differently when pegged to propositions which, in turn, obey a dif-
ferent logic. Now, in standard probability theory we were happy to presume
that there is a dynamical reason why some propositions become apt. Thus we
could explain the relationships between probabilities by showing that they are
dynamically contingent upon a given realistic kind of evolution. Before we had
classical physics to hand in order to explain the dynamical contingency of re-
lationships between probabilities. In quantum theory we don’t yet understand
the underlying dynamical physics—this is perhaps what people mean when they
say that “no-one understands quantum theory”.
Some people have attempted to make predictions about the underlying
physics—that it is somehow ‘nonlocal’ or ‘holistic’ and so forth, but such ideas
are, at their worst, waxed philosophy or, at their best, not wholly unconvincing
[16, 17]. For example, ‘holism’ is simply an uninteresting tautology—the whole
is more than the some of its parts simply because the parts interact (or because
‘parts’ are defined by the unique catalogue of their relationships with all other
‘parts’). Of course, if we assume that quanta buzz around as if they behaved
classically then we get issues with ‘nonlocal causality’ but there is nothing to
stop quantum theory being causally local when treated on its own terms (so
that we could even explain it to an alien). For example, Bell’s [17] definition of
locality relies on the mere assumption that the peg assigned to the proposition
for an event to be the case should remain unchanged when we update it, using
Bayes’ rule, to be contingent upon the outcome of an experiment at spacelike
separation. This assumption is disobeyed by quantum theory in the orthodox
interpretation and many people then call quantum theory ‘nonlocal’ because of
this fact. In GR, the very definition of what we ‘mean’ by the position of a
particle on Earth relies on its relationships with the background stars regard-
less of the fact they are far away. We don’t call this property ‘nonlocality’
in GR (for good reason, it is a causally local theory), and nor should we call
the analogous property in quantum theory or probability theory ‘nonlocality’
either. In a relational approach, part of the very definition of what we mean
by a ‘probability’ or a ‘peg’ relies on functional relationships between propo-
sitions (regardless of whether the events to which those propositions refer are
causally separate). Similarly, in evolutionary terms, geologically isolated species
might share a common phenotype which cannot be explained by their common
ancestry but, nonetheless, these seemingly ‘nonlocal’ relationships can be ex-
plained to be factitious relationships through evolutionary theory—they might
be ‘convergent’ species (i.e. we need not postulate that one of these isolated
species evolved from the other). We are not rationally compelled to assume that
there are absolute species, positions or probabilities. If we simply postulate that
seemingly ‘nonlocal’ relationships are factitious then we are freed to search for
a rational account of them—one in which we will only accept causal nonlocality
if we find some physical entity (or perhaps information) which travels at faster
than the speed of light (by the PSR).
Note that it might be that we are making a category error by maintaining
these particular peg relationships in quantum theory—a less archaic peg tax-
8
onomy might be more apt. There might be other criteria of rationality that we
‘ought’ to use; this would involve either changing the peg axioms—(5), (6) and
(7)—or by using a slightly different quantum propositional algebra; Isham and
Butterfield have investigated an approach of the former variety in [18] and we
have investigated a theory of the latter in [4, 19].
In conclusion, relationalism provides a way to be parsimonious about the
foundations of physical theory. Such relationalism has yet to be applied fully to
quantum theory, and might yet provide significant physical insight.
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